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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH MINES COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
. . . . . . 
Plaintiff and Respondent : 




Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
. . . . . . 
• . 
: 
: . . . . 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
CASE NO. 11599 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff sued Defendant for pay-
ment for 1600 tons of top soil removed from 
1 
Plaintiff's land. Defendant counterclaimed 
for damages for Plaintiff's breach of a 
written agreement, including amendments, 
granting him the right to remove top soil 
from Plaintiff's land for a period of 25 
years and for confirmation of said right. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried in the 
District Court for Salt Lake County before 
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson sitting with-
out a jury. 
As to the Plaintiff's claim, the 
Court found the facts in Defendant's favor, 
viz., the terms of the agreement concerning 
the payment for the 1600 tons of soil were 
that Defendant was not required to pay for 
2 
it until he sold it; he had paid for that 
which he had sold, and therefore, there was 
no money due the Plaintiff for the balance 
of the 1600 tons which had not been sold. 
The Court further found that Plaintiff 'a 
claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 
As to the Defendant's claims, the 
Court ruled as a matter of law that the terms 
of the grant of the right to remove soil were 
so vague and uncertain as to render it un-
enforceable; and further, that the damages 
claimed were too speculative to determine. 
The Court did not specifically rule on Defen-
dant's prayer for declaratory relief confirm-
ing his right to remove soil, but in holding 
the terms were too vague and uncertain for 
enforcement, it denied this right. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant requests the Supreme 
3 
Court of Utah to reverse the decision of the 
Lower Court as to the counterclaim and hold 
as a matter of law that the tenns of the 
agreement for the removal of soil are not 
vague and uncertain and incapable of enforce-
ment, but on the contrary, establish a defi-
nite and enforceable right to the soil on 
the land (known as a profit a prendre): and 
further, that the damages claimed are not 
too speculative so as to be incapable of 
determination. 
Also, as respects Plaintiff's 
cross-appeal, Defendant requests the Court 
to affirm the Trial court's Findings and 
Judgment against the Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Wasatch Mines 
Company, is the owner in fee of certain 
patented lode mining claims located in the 
4 
vicinity of the Wasatch Drain Tunnel in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake County (R. 7, 
9), about 78 claims of 20 acres each (R. 
159). In September, 1954, the Defendant 
and the Plaintiff and Alta Wasatch Develop-
ment Company, the owner of the mineral 
rights to the area, entered into a written 
lease agreement granting the Defendant a 
two-year period in which to take the soil 
from Plaintiff's land around the drain 
tunnel at $6.00 per ton for resale as top 
soil (R. 117, 118). This lease was not 
introduced at trial because it had been 
lost (R. 117, 144). 
During the period of 1954-56, the 
term granted in the lease, the Defendant made 
significant strides in processing and develop-
ing the soil for sale as a profitable commod-
ity. He developed a market in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, and sold a lot of the top soil in 
5 
bags of various sizes and prices and gave 
some away to prove its value (R. 123, 124). 
Defendant testified (and there was no 
evidence to the contrary) that the soil 
was used as an additive and obtained excellent 
results on trees, bushes, roses, lawns, etc., 
and that after two years, it had tremendous 
value (R. 123). 
As a result of the success of the 
first two years, a second document was execu-
ted February 9, 1956, entitled "Lease Amend-
ment", which amended the lease of 1954, which 
was lost (R. 118, 119, 124: Exh. D-3). This 
amendment increased the boundaries of the 
first lease by including all of the area 
(not just around the drain tunnel) of Plain-
tiff's mining claims (78 claims of 20 acres 
each, R. 159) that soil was removable with-
out damage to buildings or installations on 
the property or interference with mine 
6 
dumpings. Also, it provided for a 25-year 
term with option to renew on the same basis. 
It was non-assignable, but the right to the 
soil was inheritable in Defendant's sons. 
Defendant was to pay $6.00 per ton for soil 
removed, $2.00 to go to Alta Wasatch Company 
and $4.00 to the Plaintiff. There was also 
provision for sharing profits in the event 
minerals were encountered as a result of the 
soil removal. This document, Exhibit Dr3, 
contains the signatures of the presidents 
and secretaries and also the seals of the 
Plaintiff and Alta Wasatch Development 
Company, the owner of the mineral rights, 
and was recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office (Exh. D-3). 
In September of 1958, Defendant 
proposed to the Plaintiff at a meeting of 
the Board of Directors that he remove about 
1600 tons of soil and stockpile it in Midvale, 
7 
Utah, so that it would be available for 
future sales when the weather wouldn't 
permit one to get up to Little Cottonwood 
Canyon to get the soil. At this point, 
there was a dispute of facts at the trial. 
Defendant's claim was that since he was only 
going to stockpile it for future sales that 
the parties had agreed that he would pay for 
it as he sold it from the stockpile (R. 83, 
86, 87, 97). Plaintiff's position was that 
since Defendant had always paid for it as 
he removed it from Plaintiff's land, the 
same arrangement applied as respects the 
1600 ton stockpile and therefore, Defendant 
owed for the soil (R. 105). On this disputed 
issue of fact, the Trial Court found in 
Defendant's favor, i.e. that the parties 
had agreed that as respects the soil in the 
stockpile, Defendant would pay for it as he 
sold it(R. 68). 
8 
Exhibits D-4 and D-7 constitute 
further amendments to the grant of the right 
to remove the soil, upon which the counter-
claim is based. They are dated February 11, 
1959, and March 1, 1959, and were drafted 
for the purpose of reducing the $6.00 a ton 
price by 20 per cent to allow for a moisture 
content of the soil (R. 124, 125). The 
proceeds were to be divided $1.60 to the 
Plaintiff, $1.60 to Alta Wasatch Develop-
ment Company, and $1.60 to the Defendant 
(Exh. D-7). Exhibit D-7 was Defendant's copy 
of the amendment and is signed by the Plain-
tiff and Alta Wasatch Development Company. 
The original of Exhibit D-7 was signed by 
the Defendant also (R. 126). 
The above-mentioned documents, 
viz., the two-year lease agreement of 1954, 
(the lost document), the 25-year extension 
of 1956 (Exhibit D-3), and the amendments 
9 
of 1959 (Exhs. D-4 and D-7), supported by 
the course of conduct of the parties under 
these documents, are the bases of Defendant•s 
counterclaim, claiming the right to the soil 
upon the land of the Plaintiff. As to the time 
of Plaintiff's breach of the same, it probably 
occurred in 1963 or 1964, although there are 
indications in the record that at least some 
of the members of the Plaintiff were dissat-
if ied with their agreement as far back as 
September, 1956 (See Exhs.05 andI6). But 
essentially, Defendant removed soil from 
Plaintiff 1s land pursuant to the above docu-
ments up until the fall of 1963 (R. 131). 
The record shows that Plaintiff was trying 
to stop Defendant from removing soil in 
September, 1963 (R. 138), and although soil 
was removed after that in the same year, 
Plaintiff refused to allow any further 
removals after August of 1964 (Exh. D-9: 
10 
R. 130). Likewise, Defendant has not 
sold any more soil from the 1600 ton stock-
pile because of inability to obtain a large 
buyer for it without access to more (R. 
166, 167). At any rate, Plaintiff admitted 
in its reply to the counterclaim that it 
had repudiated Defendant's claimed rights as 
hereinabove set forth (R. 9). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO THE SOIL ON PLAIN-
Tl FF' S LAND WERE TOO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN FOR 
ENFORCEMENT. 
As stated in the Statement of Facts 
above, Defendant bases his right to remove the 
soil from Plaintiff's land upon the written 
lease agreement of 1954 (lost document), the 
written extension of 1956 (Exh.D3) and the 
written amendments of 1959 (Exhs.D4 and07). 
11 
The Lower Court's ruling against him as a 
matter of law was because the terms were 
said to be too "vague and uncertain" for 
enforcement. 
There is no need here for a lengthy 
discussion of the terms, as the documents 
speak for themselves. In order to assist 
in the determination that there is no vague-
ness or uncertainty involved, these terms 
for the removal of soil by the Defendant 
are summarized as follows: 
(a) Duration: Two years granted 
in 1954: an additional 25 years granted in 
1956 with option to renew on same basis: 
(b) Area of Grant or Quantity: 
There is no quantity limit. The grant is 
for all soil in area of claims owned by 
Plaintiff, 78 claims of 20 acres each in 
Little cottonwood Canyon near the Wasatch 
Drain Tunnel: formerly, under the 1954 
12 
agreement, the boundaries were limited to 
the area directly around the drain tunnel, 
but the 1956 extension added the total area.l 
(c) Parties: The Plaintiff, owner 
of the land, and Alta Wasatch Development 
Company, owner of the mineral rights, Granters, 
and the Defendant, Grantee. The 1956 amend-
ment added Defendant's sons and they had the 
exclusive right to the soil. 
(d) Inheritable or Assignable: The 
right to remove the soil was non-assignable, 
but it was inheritable. 
(e) Price and Division of Profits: 
Originally it was $6.00 per ton, split 2/3 
and 1/3 between Plaintiff and Alta Wasatch 
Development Company respectively: then it 
1That grants describing land as "all my proper-
ty" in a given area and similar descriptions 
constitute sufficient legal descriptions and 
that courts construe descriptions liberally to 
uphold them, see generally 23 Am.Jur.2d, Deeds, 
sections under topic IX, Descriptions of Proper· 
ty, and cases there cited, particularly sec-
tions 222 and 231. 
13 
was changed to $4.80 a ton, split equally 
three ways between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant and Alta Wasatch Development 
company. Any mineral deposits encountered 
were to be claimed by Alta Wasatch Develop-
ment Company with Plaintiff receiving a 15% 
roya 1 ty. 
How the terms could be any more 
definite, clear or certain is difficult to 
conceive, and the Court erred in failing to 
confirm Plaintiff's right to continue to 
remove soil pursuant to those terms. Admit-
tedly, the documents appear to be home drawn 
and lack legal finesse, but it is a well-
established rule of law that courts do not look 
kindly on the destruction of agreements Of 
11-;:igants on the ground of vagueness or un-
certainty of the terms. In American Juris-
prudence 2d, we read: 
The determination that an agree-
14 
ment is sufficiently definite is favored. 
Therefore, the courts will, if possible, 
so construe the agreement as to carry 
into effect the reasonable intention 
of the parties, if that can be ascer-
tained. The law leans against the 
destruction of contracts for uncertain-
ty, particularly where one of the par-
ties has performed his part of the 
contract. 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, 
section 75. 
In the present case, not only are the terms 
clear and definite, as set out above, but the 
narties operated thereunder for many years 
prior to Plaintiff's breach. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO REMOVE SOIL IS 
1\ PROFIT A' PRENDRE, AND AS SUCH, SHOULD BE 
DECLARED VALID AND RECOGNIZED IN THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
A profit a' prendre is the right 
2 to remove soil from the land of another, and 
in counsel's trial brief and closing argu-
ments to the Lower Court, it was argued that 
generally 34 Words and Phrases, Profit 
a' Prendre, pp. 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements, 
and Licenses, section 4. 
15 
the parties had created such an interest. 
lt is felt that the Lower Court's failure 
to confirm Defendant's right to remove the 
soil from Plaintiff's land is because there 
is very little case law in the State of Utah 
on the law of profit a' prendre, and the 
Court was therefore unfamiliar with it. 3 
It is submitted that in the instant case, the 
Trial Court erred in refusing declaratory 
relief as to Defendant's counterclaim and 
failing to hold that the documents and facts 
discussed above created a profit a' prendre. 
In a case based on a prayer for 
declaratory relief, as here, with practically 
identical facts to those in the present case, 
viz., an agreement in writing under seal, 
granting the exclusive right to remove soil 
3onLy two Utah cases have been located on the 
subject; though both recognize the doctrine of 
profit a' prendre, neither define it adequately. 
as has been done in other states. Haynes v. 
Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 85 P.2d 861 (1939); Deseret 
v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 259 P.2d 607 
(1953). 
16 
for a definite term, with an option to renew, 
a definite price dependent on the quantity 
removed, a prohibition against assignment, and 
under which the parties operated for a number 
of years, the Court in holding that the parties 
had created a profit a' prendre observed in 
Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J. Sup. 24, 91 A.2d 
514 ( 1952): 
Moreover the agreement was executed 
under seal, acknowledged and recorded, 
all of which are the appropriate for-
malities in the creation of an incorporeal 
interest. There is often something of 
implication in the use of language and 
in the conduct of the contracting par-
ties in the search for their intentions. 
Quarry rights, mining rights, oil rights, 
and other similar rights relating to the 
severance of the physical substances of a 
servient tenement are normally more com-
monly interests a' prendre appurtenant 
or in gross, or easements in gross. 
Our study of the agreement, our concep-
tion of the exclusive character of the 
right granted and its distinctive nature, 
have guided us to the conclusion that the 
so-called privilege which was invested in 
Schultz was in the law within the category 
of a right of profit a' prendre in gross, 
17 
sometimes more modernly and liberally 
designated as an easement in gross. 
2 American Law of Property (1952) §8.9, 
et seq., pp. 235, et seq.: Thompson, Real 
Property (1939) §§250, 260, 264 and 268; 
Tiffany, Real Property (1939) §§842, 843; 
Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 
N.Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (Ct.App. 1920). 
Cf. Wenger v. Clay Tp. of St. Joseph 
County, 61 Ind. App. 640, 112 N.E. 402 
(Ind. App. Ct. 1916). 
Moreover, the ldbel placed on the 
agreement by the parties4 or the fact that 
words of grant are absent. or where the instru-
rnent is prepared by a layman, as here, do 
invalidate the profit a' but the 
language should be construed as a whole to 
determine the relationEhip the parties intended 
to create. In Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. 
Northline corporation, 207 Minn. 126, 290 
222 (1940), the Court observed: 
4Note that the exhibits and the record 
refer to Defendant's right to take the soil 
variously as "lease", "lease amendment", 
"agreement", "agency agreement", "soil 
lease", "contract 11 , etc. 
18 
Although customary words of grant are 
absent, it must be remembered the drafts-
man was a layman. The confusing use of 
"landlord", "license'', "indenture", "right' 
and "privilege" leaves little to rely upon 
as a basis for decision. In addition, it 
is a persuasive reason why too much relianc 
cannot be placed upon the language em-
ployed. Reading the instrument as a unit, 
it satisfactorily conveys the conception 
that a more substantial relationship was 
intended than defendant concedes. The 
particular items mentioned, on the whole, 
lead to the conclusion that a profit a 
prendre was granted. 
A profit a' prendre is simply "the 
right to take soil . and the like from 
another's land." Munsey v. Mills & Garrity, 
155 Tex. 469, 283 S.W. 754 (1926). Note how 
closely the definition given in 25 Am. Jur.2d, 
and Licenses, section 4 at pages 
414-20, parallels the facts of the present 
CJ 
A profit a prendre is a right exercised 
by one person in the soil of another, 
accompanied with participation in the 
profits of the soil, or a right to take 
a part of the soil or produce of the 
land. It is therefore distinguishable 
19 
trom an easement, since one of the 
features of an easement is the absence 
of all right to participate in the 
prof its of the soil charged with it. 
A profit a prendre is similar to an 
easement, however, in that it is an 
interest in land. It cannot be created 
by parol, but is created by grant, and 
may be eithPr appurtenaut to other land 
or in gross. If enjoyed by reason of 
holding certain other estate, it is 
regarded as appurtenant to that estate 
and may not be severed therefrom. On 
the other hand, if it belongs to an 
individual distinct from any ownership 
of other lands, it takes the character 
of an estate in the land itself and is 
assignable or inheritable. 
Clearly the Defendant was granted such an 
interest in land as described above. In this 
,·ase, 1t is a profit a' prendre in gross: it 
an interest in realty in the nature of 
a covenant running with the land,5 and the 
Dcf2ndant has several years remaining in which 
to take soil from the land pursuant thereto. 
Even if the Lower Court's opinion that damages 
5see Richfield Oil Co. of Cal. Hercules 
Co., 112 Cal.App. 431, 297 Pac. 73 
(1931). 
20 
·peculative were correct, it was error 
not to grant the declaratory relief prayed for 
by the Defendant, confirming his right to 
continue to remove the top soil under the 
terms, as discussed above. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFEN-
DANT'S DAMAGES ARE SO SPECULATIVE THAT IT 
WOULD BE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THEM. 
In ruling that the Defendant's 
damages were so speculative that it could 
not determine them, the Lower Court mis-
the familiar rule of law which 
rtquires that damages, to be awarded, must 
be certain. Therefore, Defendant seeks a 
reversal as a matter of law. 
In the first place, most cases have 
modified the harshness of this doctrine by 
stating that damages need be proved only 
with reasonable certainty, thereby removing 
the notion that an exactness is required of 
21 
c.1 party seeking a damage recovery. 22 Am. 
Jur.2d, Damages, section 22; Dee v. San Pedro 
L.A.& S.L. R. Co., 50 Utah 167, 167 Pac. 246. 
In the second place, and perhaps even more 
important, the requirement that damages be 
proved to a reasonable certainty refers to 
the fact of damages, not the amount. Thus, 
whenever the fact of injury is proved with 
reasonable certainty, uncertainty as to 
amount of damages will not prevent the trier 
of fact from awarding damages. Nor is mere 
difficulty in the assessment of damages a 
sufficient reason for refusing them. 22 Arn. 
Jur.2d, Damages, sections 22, 23, 25: 
v. San Pedro L.A.& S.L. R. Co., supra. 
In the present case, there is 
no question as to the fact of damages for 
Plaintiff's breach. The only facts presented 
on the question of damages at the trial were 
22 
ise presented by the Defendant, and 
there was no attempt by the Plaintiff to 
rebut it or to introduce any contrary 
evidence upon which the Court could base a 
finding of no damage. The import of the 
Court's order denying damages {R. 68) is 
not that whether Defendant had any damages 
is speculative, but rather that such damages 
as he had are speculative, i.e. the amount. 
It is Defendant's position that in so ruling 
the court failed to apply the rules dis-
cussed above as to determining the amount 
of damages when they may be difficult to 
assess or incapable of exact determination, 
and thus, it presents a question of law for 
this Court to decide. The fact that Defen-
dant 1 s damages may have some uncertainty as 
to the amount (on the question of lost profits). 
or that they may be difficult to assess, is 
no ground for denying them. 
23 
-
The damages sustained by the 
Defendant, which are the natural consequences 
of Plaintiff's breach, are twofold: (1) 
damages for loss of profits from 1964 to 
date for Plaintiff's refusal to allow Defen-
dant to continue to remove soil, and (2) 
damages for time and money expended in 
reliance upon the agreement and in prepara-
tion for performance. 
1. Loss of Profits. While it 
is true that there can be no recovery for loss 
of profits where it is uncertain whether any 
prof it at all would have been made, as dis-
cussed above, certainty as to amount is not 
required. In 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, section 
172, we read: 
But it must be borne in mind that 
prospective profits are to some extent 
uncertain and problematical, and so, 
on that account or on account of the 
difficulties in the way of proof, a 
person complaining of breach of contract 
is not deprived of all remedy; uncer-
24 
tainty merely as to the amount of 
profits that would have been made 
does not prevent a recovery. 
In the present case we have a ten 
year history (from the time of the 1954 lease 
agreement when Defendant began marketing the 
soil to Plaintiff's repudiation and refusal 
to allow further removals of soil after 1963) 
in which to look for data upon which to com-
pute loss of profits. The evidence is un-
contradicted that Defendant was to receive 
$1.60 net profit for every ton of soil removed 
and sold (Exh.D7; R. 98, 99). In addition, 
Defendant was president and stockholder of 
Mineral Rich Soil, Inc., one of the pur-
chasers of the soil (R. 99), and was there-
fore a beneficiary of profit made by the 
corporation. As to the $1.60 per ton, the 
computation of prospective profits is done 
simply by multiplying $1.60 by the number 
25 
of tons to be sold, e.g., the sale of 260 
tons in November, 1963, to Hudson and Stewart 
(R. 133, 162) would bring a $416.00 net 
prof it to Defendant. The computation of 
profits for the soil sold variously in 5 lb. 
bags for 95 cents (R. 124, 160), 100 lb. 
bags for $5.00 (R. 124, 160), 40 lb. bags 
(R. 160), etc., some mixed equally with 
sand (R. 165),would be more difficult as it 
requires the figuring out of expenses to be 
deducted, e.g., shipping, mixing, cost of 
sales, etc. (R. 99), but as pointed out, the 
difficulty involved should not prevent its 
being done. 
The central problem (if there is 
a oroblem) involved on the loss of prof its 
issue is not questions of prices and net 
profit, as there is ample evidence as to 
these matters and as to the value of the soil, 
as discussed above. The real question, and 
a??arently the one which concerned the 
Lower Court, is how does one determine 
how many tons Defendant would have sold 
from 1964 to date if Plaintiff had not 
refused to allow him to continue removing 
soil, i.e., how many 5, 40 and 100 lb. bags 
would be sold, or how many more two to three 
hundred ton sales such as the one to Hudson 
and Stewart would be made, and would Defen-
dant have been successful in locating what 
he termed a bulk sale buyer for sales of 
around 5,000 tons {R. 166). 
Does this problem make the fact of 
damages too speculative? Admittedly, because 
of the nature of the product and the market 
(i.e., need for large buyers and need to 
cultivate one's own market), it would be 
difficult to be exact on one's estimate of 
the probable sales, but in order to uphold 
the ruling of the Trial Court, under the 
law discussed above, it would have to be 
that there was no showing to a reason-
able certainty that Defendant would have sold 
any soil at all. Consider the following: 
Here is a man who in 1954 obtains a 2-year 
soil lease and conunences to develop it, sell 
it, give it away to prove its value and create 
a market, etc. (R. 123, 124). Bog analyses 
(R. 158) and core drillings were obtained 
showing the soil was salable to a depth of 
35 feet (R. 160). Later, a stockpile was 
set up for times when it would be difficult 
to get soil up the canyon (R. 168). His plans 
were long range, having in 1956 obtained a 
25-year extension with option to renew (Exh. 
D-3). Although the record contains no state-
ment as to the total tonnage removed from 
1954 to 1964, or the total sales or profits, 
there is ample evidence of the creation of a 
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market, that the soil is valuable, and was 
extracted by Defendant during that period 
for resale. There is in the record an 
accurate list of sales in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
during 1959, primarily in the first half of th, 
year. Exhibit D-15 (three separate items) 
shows these sales. The exhibit speaks for 
itself, but if counsel's addition is correct, 
the total sales of soil on the three parts 
of the exhibit are in the neighborhood of 
$3,300.00. It is true that Defendant had 
a little trouble after that with his sales-
man in Las Vegas becoming ill (R. 161), but 
then he located Hudson and Stewart of Texas, 
as buyers (R. 130). After that, Defendant 
was prohibited from removing any more soil. 
can we now say as a matter of law that there 
is no showing to a reasonable certainty that 
there would have been any more sales, or 
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that there is nothing in the record to 
indicate what kind of program Defendant was 
conducting so as to afford a reasonable 
basis for an estimate of the amount? Is 
Defendant to be denied recovery of lost 
profits because the nature of the business 
makes it a little difficult to determine? 
It is respectfully submitted 
that Defendant was engaged in a long-term 
venture; that he showed the value of the 
soil at the trial and that he was making 
sales and profits at various times (R. 92, 
97 I 100, 105, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131, 133, 
158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166, 168: Exhs. 
D-8, D-15), and that he is entitled to have 
the loss of profits since 1963 determined 
and be awarded the same. 
2. Expenses in Reliance. Defen-
dant may recover not only for the net gains 
which were prevented by the breach, but also 
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tor expenses incurred in reliance on the 
Plaintiff's performance of its end of the 
bargain. It should be borne in mind that 
the agreement between the parties for the 
removal of soil was for the profit of both 
parties and that Defendant incurred expendi-
tures and went to considerable effort to 
accomplish that end. Consider his early 
efforts in creating a market, the bog analyses, 
the core drillings, the obtaining of buyers, 
the marketing methods, advertising in news-
papers (letter attached to Exh. D-8), and 
even the stockpiling of the 1600 tons in Mid-
vale - all of these were for Plaintiff's 
benefit as well as Defendant's. He paid 
out $2,500.00 in cash just to haul the soil 
to the stockpile (Exh. D-1), which expendi-
ture was in vain because Plaintiff's refusal 
to allow Defendant to take more soil greatly 
diminished his chances of selling the soil in 
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stockpile (R. 167, 168). These expendi-
tures of time and money incurred by the 
Defendant were certainly within the contem-
plation of the parties, being for the benefit 
of both, and such are known as preparation 
or part-performance damages and are recoverable 
Hackersmith v. Hanley, 29 Ore. 27, 44 Pac. 
497 (1896); Murphey v. Northeastern Construc-
tion Co., 31 Ga. App. 715, 121 S.E. 848 ( 1924); 
17 A.L.R.2d 1300; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, 
sections 47, 159-61. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law confirming his right to a 
profit a' prendre in the soil on Plaintiff's 
land. This is true regardless of the dispo-
sition of the damages issues. The terms of the 
profit a' prendre are neither vague nor un-
certain, and any irregularities as may exist 
32 
because of the home drawn documents should 
be resolved in favor of the obvious intent 
of the parties as shown by the language of 
the documents as a whole and by the conduct 
of the parties thereunder. 
On the damages questions, it would 
appear the Court should apply the widely ac-
cepted rule that the amount of damages need 
not be proved to a reasonable certainty where 
the fact of damages is so proved. A little 
conjecture as to the amount is okay when not 
abused; which is worse, that or allowing the 
Plaintiff to breach after 10 years without 
payment for loss of profits just because the 
nature of Defendant's business does not easily 
lend itself to an exact determination of 
future profits. Even if the Court rules 
against the Defendant as to loss of profits, 
the reliance damages should be awarded as 
there is no speculation as to the amounts, 
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e.g., $2,500.00 cost to set up the stock-
pile. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David H. Day, Esq. 
David A. Goodwill, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
cross-Respondent 
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